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Abstract   This article analyzes educational targeting in Argentina, Brazil  and Chile from a 
sociological point of view. In essence, it presents the ‘logic of induction’ as an ideal type. This 
pedagogic discourse is the vehicle of an educational anti-poverty strategy that expects to induce 
clearly targeted groups to improve on their own. The analysis explores the influence of the  
global educational agenda, the empirical connection between this discourse and the mechanism 
of emulation as well as the territorialization of educational inequality. Emulation plays the main 
role inasmuch as the logic of induction eventually leads the target  groups to compare their  
adverse  situation  with  more  privileged  groups,  what  legitimizes  the  current  structures  of  
categorical inequality (Tilly 1998). Finally, a brief statistical summary reports that the trends of  
educational inequality have remained stable as far as urban- rural ratios (in Brazil and Chile) 
and regional disparities (in the three countries) are concerned.
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This  article  presents  the  theoretical  rationale  and  the  first  empirical  findings  of  a 
research  project  on  globalization,  anti-poverty  and  education  policies  carried  in 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile (see note 1). Following the recommendations included in 
the global educational agenda, since the nineties these three countries have experienced 
with educational targeting as a means to alleviate poverty. My point is that targeting 
itself has contributed to stabilize rather than reduce educational inequalities,  because 
this anti-poverty strategy triggers the emulation mechanism. However, it also opens a 
political contention whose outcome is still open. Although the article will not analyze 
them, in the last years new articulations of anti-poverty and education policies have just 
been  designed  and  implemented  in  order  to  stretch  equity-  driven  educational 
intervention in these countries.
The  text  is  divided  into  four  parts.  The  first  two  ones  define  the  concepts  of 
globalization,  educational  inequalities  and  emulation  that  have  been  used  in  the 
research.  The  final  two  ones  report  findings  of  emulation  and  stable  educational 
inequalities in the three countries (see note 2).
Globalization and the education policy agenda
Several specialists in education policy have convincingly argued that globalization has 
impinged  on  this  area  of  state  activity  by  establishing  an  agenda  that  includes  the 
official  objectives  and instruments  of education.  A salient  novelty  is  that  nowadays 
states themselves, international organizations, corporations and social movements try to 
fashion the agenda at the global level of political decision (Carnoy 1999, Dale 1999, 
2000, Bonal 2002, Robertson, Bonal and Dale 2003). Since this is another face of the 
complex, multi-scalar processes that have brought about globalization (Jessop 2001), 
these authors provide quite a useful theoretical framework to explore how education and 
anti-poverty policies have been combined.
In their view, globalization impinges on the education policy agenda by means of re-
scaling processes.  Re-scaling takes  place between the global,  global-  regional,  state, 
sub-state regional and the local levels of politics and policy-making. Observers have 
noticed that states have lost (or decided to lose) very crucial competencies in favor of 
global  markets  (e.g.  telecommunications,  accounting)  and international  organizations 
(e.g. trade) (Strange 1996). Similarly, the World Bank conditioned loans, the UNESCO 
Education for All program and the WTO GATS negotiation have introduced education 
in  international  politics  (Bonal  2002).  Actually,  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  have 
complied with the core global recommendations issued by the WB, UNESCO and the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
other  supra-national  bodies  in  the  continent.  Two  kinds  of  reasons  seem  to  have 
persuaded their governments, either a notorious will to implement the ‘best practices’ 
(mostly, Chile) or a combination of external imposed conditions and internal political 
projects (Argentina and Brazil). Scale shifts have also entailed de-centralization: thus, 
for  the  last  two  decades  Argentinean  provincias,  Brazilian  estados  and  Chilean 
municipalities have become the main educational authorities. 
Educational targeting is an outcome of policy re-scaling in Southern America. Roughly 
speaking,  this  anti-poverty strategy consists  of positive pedagogic and/  or  economic 
discrimination of the worst off in order to improve their performance, alleviate their 
poverty and reduce general inequality. Often, it also aims to ‘activate’ students and their 
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parents in order to improve their academic results, their labor strategies or simply their 
capability to ask for the social services they need. For instance, the World Bank (2001, 
2004)  recommends  educational  targeting  as  a  key  tool  to  guarantee  economic 
opportunities, empowerment spaces and integral security for the poor keeping a balance 
between  selective  action  and  minimal  but  universal  education,  health  and  pension 
systems.  The  Inter-  American  Development  Bank  has  also  added  targeting  to  its 
education  policy  guide  for  the  governments  in  the  region  (Castro  2000).  And  the 
Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America  (CEPAL)  has  emphatically  promoted 
targeting for the last decade. Recently, CEPAL (2002) has estimated and welcome a 
middle-term decline of illiteracy and drop-out rates in the region; as a consequence, the 
Economic Commission expects that the poor are endowed with more years of schooling 
and therefore get greater economic returns. 
In Argentina educational targeting and full de-centralization were implemented almost 
simultaneously in the early nineties. Most educational competencies were transferred to 
regional  governments  (provincias).  The  Social  Educational  Plan  (Plan  Social  
Educativo)  was  the  only  initiative  that  the  central  government  directly  managed.  It 
offered  pedagogic  support  and  management  consultancy  to  the  worst  performing 
schools  and  delivered  grants  to  the  poorest  households.  After  the  2001  crisis  the 
Kirchner  government  has  replaced  that  plan  with  the  Integral  Plan  for  Educational 
Equality (Plan Integral para la Igualdad Educativa), that aims to implement pro-poor 
action  beyond  strict  targeting.  In  Brazil  municipalities  and  regional  governments 
(estados)  are  in  charge of  primary  and secondary education,  although some Federal 
initiatives have been undertaken. At first, the government tried to raise enrolment via 
school-based management  but  in the late  nineties  it  also decided to  give a grant  to 
students coming from poor households (School Grant, Bolsa Escola). Afterwards, ome 
local  authorities  have  deployed similar  schemes,  and the  new Lula  government  has 
issued a blueprint of a benefit that integrates educational, food and housing aid. In Chile 
the  dictatorship  transferred  school  management  to  local  authorities  in  the  eighties. 
Educational  pedagogic  targeting  became  one  of  the  main  instruments  that  the  first 
democratic  government  promoted in  primary  schools  against  poverty  and inequality 
(900  Schools  Program,  Programa  900  Escuelas).  Since  2000  President  Lagos  has 
decided to emphasize targeting in secondary schools, combining both economic aid for 
families  and  pedagogic  and  management  support  for  schools  (High-school  for  All 
Program, Programa Liceo para Todos). 
Like CEPAL (2002), most policy-makers have made their decisions on the grounds that 
the  Argentinean,  Brazilian  or  Chilean  education  system  suffered  from  important 
shortcomings,  even  though  they  simply  expected  to  push  on the  declining  literacy, 
enrolment and drop-out rates recorded after democratic transitions. My analysis takes 
account of these expectations and the associated assumptions in order to look for a sort 
of evidence that is different to the indispensable evaluation studies. Whereas these ones 
produce  evidence  for  decision-making  by  spelling  out  the  connections  between  the 
objectives,  implementation  and  impacts  of  programs,  I  will  focus  on  the  content 
analysis  of  the  official  discourse  about  educational  targeting  for  several  theoretical 
reasons. On the one hand, educational policies and the re-scaled educational agenda are 
likely to deploy rhetorical strategies of legitimization (Dale 1989; Ball 1994; Popkewitz 
1994). On the other hand, in the same way as educational messages are normally re-
contextualized into the academic and the official fields (Bernstein 1990, 1996), such re-
contextualization  is  probably  amplified  with  re-scaling.  Actually,  targeting  transmits 
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and  translates  educational  messages  from  one  context  to  another:  namely,  from 
international organizations to national governments, from national official programs to 
academic discourse, from national programs to schools and from schools to families and 
children. Besides implementing positive discrimination, targeting also delimits who are 
the needy and what are they supposed to learn in order to see their condition improved.
 
A research object must be defined to answer this question  (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992). In my view, the logic of induction is an appropriate label to conceptualize the 
focus  of  my  analysis,  which  is  an  element  of  the  official  and  academic  pedagogic 
discourses too (Bernstein 1990, 1996). By ‘logic’ I mean that this discourse entails a 
definition of the poor and their  ideal  behavior.  Actually,  this  strategy asks program 
managers and school teachers to distinguish their beneficiaries in a clear and objective 
way. Different records produce lots of necessary data to define target groups: either a 
questionnaire,  an academic  examination,  a  certification  of  income or  the  systematic 
observation  of social  workers  are  useful  to  estimate  who should be targeted,  if  this 
population is effectively covered, if some beneficiaries don’t deserve the benefit and so 
on. With ‘induction’ I mean the will to activate the target group so that the poor or the 
low  performing  students  learn  to  succeed  autonomously.  In  other  words,  they  are 
‘induced’ to be autonomous social and economic actors who overcome their adverse 
material  situation  on  their  own.  So,  this  ‘logic’  expects  that  ‘induction’  triggers  a 
particular causal process of poverty reduction. 
The  logic  of  induction  is  an  ideal  type,  that  is,  the  concept  highlights  the  more 
significant and common traits of heterogeneous realities. Sociologists are very fond of 
ideal types: for instance, Max Weber and Karl Manheim designed ideal types to study 
work ethics and conservatism. Recently, other ones have been helpful to spell out the 
clues of the ‘new capitalism’ (Fairclough 2003) and the ‘new imperialism’ (Tikly 2004). 
Mine is a more specific issue but draws on an analogous procedure. Once we identify 
the features of these discourses in a context, we can inquire which political orientation 
eventually  determines  the logic of induction:  either  poverty alleviation by means of 
targeting,  or social  control by establishing hierarchical  social  rules.  Doubtless, these 
orientations can also face possible conflicts with social agents who support alternative 
interests and worldviews, since they do not emerge from a historical void.
Emulation and educational inequalities
In  my  opinion,  the  logic  of  induction  hardly  contributes  to  alleviate  educational 
inequality. This argument requires to complement the former analytical concept with 
three definitions that take account of  inequality,  emulation and  territorialization. A 
sensible hypothesis would state that the logic of induction contributes to keep a stable 
educational gap mostly between social classes and ethic groups, albeit at higher school 
cycles. Such divide is visible in territorial terms due to the location of these groups. 
Inter  alia,  one  main  causal  mechanism  of  this  stability  arises  from  the  logic  of 
induction. As a discourse, it sets social representations that feature the local poor and 
legitimizes  operational  decisions that  trigger  emulation by asking them to assimilate 
remote and alien patterns of behavior. At last, it is other people such as national and 
global  decision-  makers,  program managers  and scholars  who blame them for  their 
actual social practices and associate the alternative pattern with a higher prestige. My 
analysis explores how targeted programs outline educational inequality by establishing 
who have a weak educational potential and the way to overcome this deficit.
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Generally speaking, the former effect is another symptom of globalization. This is a 
complex,  multi-scalar  process (Jessop 2001) whereby both the institutional  space of 
educational  decision-  making  and  the  role  of  education  in  the  prevailing  territorial 
matrix undergo deep transformations. Multi-scalar political processes institute new rules 
of emulation by means of certain anti-poverty strategies; people apply these rules at the 
same time as they experience other causal mechanisms that eventually shape categorical 
inequality  and  territorial  educational  inequality  too.  Complex  causality  is  at  stake 
inasmuch as several and heterogeneous factors impinge on social inequality.
Social inequality emerges when the distribution of a resource is biased against some 
individuals; it is much more perverse if they cannot develop their basic capabilities due 
to this lack (Sen 1999). As to education, statistical data report inequality with regards to 
literacy,  enrolment,  drop-out  rates,  graduation  and  performance.  Such  information 
makes  reference  to  credentials  and  cognitive  learning,  but  there  is  no  official 
information  about  basic  capabilities  such as  imagination,  affiliation  or  care  that  are 
involved in education too (Nussbaum 2000). In spite of their partial scope, these data 
can be very useful if they are read at different thresholds, since inequality is clearly 
worse when recorded at  the lower educational  levels.  The UNDP (2004) Education 
Index  portrays  these  thresholds  by  measuring  literacy  and  enrolment  (at  primary, 
secondary  and  university  levels).  Other  sources  (CEPAL  2002,  Government  of 
Argentina- Ministry of Education 2002, Government of Chile- Ministry of Education 
2000, 2004, Government of Brazil- Ministry of Education 2004) provide further details 
about educational processes and outcomes. Thus, the trend of educational inequalities in 
Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  can  be  easily  assessed  drawing  on  this  partial  ordinal 
measures of enrolment and achievement at primary and secondary levels.
Charles  Tilly’s  (1998:  10)  concept  of  emulation is  the  main  hermeneutic  tool  that 
grasps  the  links  between  the  logic  of  induction  and  inequalities.  In  Tilly’s  view, 
inequalities are pervasive and episodic due to many circumstances, but they become 
durable when a biased distribution roots on structural categories such as class, gender or 
ethnicity. Then any local distributional bias is reinforced by supra-local economic and 
political  power  through  the  individuals’  previous  understanding  of  the  situation. 
Basically, two mechanisms create these categorical inequalities, namely exploitation (a 
category commands resources and gets the most out of alien labor) and opportunity 
hoarding  (a  category  monopolizes  access  to  a  valuable  resource).  And  two  further 
mechanisms generalize their influence: namely, emulation (the transplanting of social 
norms)  and adaptation  (the  legitimization  of  inequality  through daily  routines).  The 
logic of induction impinges on social inequality by reinforcing emulation, which works 
in the frame of this wider multi-causal set.
By  defining  the  category  of  the  needy  and  requiring  them  to  change  their  social 
practices,  the  logic  of  induction  easily  transplants  the  social  rules  of  endeavor  and 
individual success from the professional privileged to the popular disadvantaged social 
contexts.  Formally,  technical  recommendations,  reports  and  previous  evaluations  of 
unconditional  benefits  have  concluded  that  targeting  and  activation  would  tap  the 
potential human creativity of the poor (CEPAL 2002; World Bank 2004). However, in a 
local school or in a local urban area targeted schools and students constitute a very 
visible,  powerless  and poor social  category within the implicit  but  real  and broader 
categorical  inequality.  Under  these  circumstances  pervasive  hierarchical  comparison 
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threatens  to  overrun  the  liberation  of  that  potential.  A  content  analysis  of  official 
discourse indicates whether the promoters of this strategy look for convincing proofs of 
its alleged stimulating effects, or rather take the game of hierarchical comparisons for 
granted and eventually legitimize categorical inequality by institutionalizing this social 
norm. 
With  regards  to  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile,  Tilly’s  (1998)  analysis  suggests  that 
educational  inequalities  have  declined  because  the  democratic  governments 
promulgated  the  universal  right  to  education,  and  thus  neutralized  educational 
opportunity hoarding. Before, many women, urban popular classes, ethnic minorities 
and peasants were excluded from education simply because there were not schools for 
them, but literacy and enrolment have certainly increased in spite of economic hardship 
after  democratic  transitions.  However,  important  shortcomings  persist  and  income 
poverty keeps damaging the very conditions of education (Tedesco and López 2002). 
Thus, the general trend has been initial equalization and later stagnation. A plausible 
explanation of this pattern could hypothesize that the final institutional arrangements 
and official programs eventually favored emulation. The available evidence can indicate 
whether  the  logic  of  induction  enacts  emulation  through  hierarchical  comparisons 
instead of effectively  introducing the poor in  labor  markets  and collective  decision- 
making processes.
Furthermore, the very logic of induction and the resulting emulation finally impinge on 
territorial  inequality  too.  Robertson,  Bonal  and  Dale  (2003)  have  borrowed  some 
geographical  concepts  from Brenner  (1999)  and Harvey (2000)  in  order  to  analyze 
education policy.  Generally,  geographers argue that  human agency transforms space 
into  particular  territories  by  different  means  such  as  boundaries,  communications, 
consumption, social movements and identity. This multi- causal, continuous spatial re-
structuring is territorialization. In their view, globalization has restructured the Fordist, 
state-centered territorial matrix by transforming economic and state activity. Therefore, 
if  bureaucratic  states  monopolize  legal  coercion  within  a  territory  (Weber  1971), 
emergent multi-scalar processes (Jessop 2001) that impinge on coercion and other fields 
of state activity have probably had an impact on that territorial matrix too. 
The  former  general  argument  can  be  easily  applied  to  education.  For  a  long  time 
bureaucratic states have extended compulsory schooling from lower to higher levels in 
order to unify their territory (Bendix 1974, Boli, Meyer and Ramírez 1985). In the end, 
most  of  them have committed  to  equalizing  education  (Meyer  2001),  but  education 
reforms inspired in competing political ideologies have not had a uniform impact on 
‘real’  equalization.  Whereas  finance-driven  education  policy  in  fact  threatens  to 
exacerbate inequality (Carnoy 1999), a school system that lacks early selection, that is 
efficient in teaching and provides strong incentives for students to continue to a free or 
subsidized higher education is likely to promote equality (Jonsson and Erikson 2000: 
377, Duru-Bellat,  Mons and Suchaut 2004). The logic of induction departs from the 
former strategy but downplays the second kind of allegedly passive measures. In logical 
terms, it could strengthen and stretch ‘real’ equalization if activation was an effective 
leverage; conversely, if the expected effect was weak, equalization would not be the 
outcome.  In  political  terms,  emulation  might  not  be  enacted  if  this  discourse  was 
grounded on well-documented positive evaluations; conversely, the logic of induction 
can trigger emulation if it is not underpinned by reliable evidence and is associated with 
references  to the inferior  position of the needy. Then poverty assessments and anti- 
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poverty interventions  would expose this  weak social  category  to  the surveillance  of 
more resourceful and prestigious local groups in the heterogeneous towns and regions 
of these immense countries, and would eventually contribute to hinder equalization.
But political global action sometimes produces unintended effects at lower-range scales. 
Certainly, the logic of induction is currently under attack and alternative anti-poverty 
guidelines could gain momentum in Southern America. This is the kind of tension that 
we can spell out if the logic of induction is defined as a discourse, because discourses 
reflect  conflicts  by  representing  the  hierarchies  established  between  certain  social 
groups  and  expressing  their  identities  and  projects  (Fairclough  2003).  Notably,  the 
official discourse on education provides very significant clues due to its location in the 
broader social structure (Bernstein 1990, 1996).
Inducing the poor to emulate the non-poor
So far previous research has sketched but has not yet analyzed the logic of induction 
systematically in Argentina (Duschatzky and Redondo 2000) and Chile (Berardi 2001). 
Fortunately,  Fairclough  (2000:  51-65)  has  published  a  documented  analysis  of  the 
British policy against social exclusion that is very helpful to figure out how emulation 
can  be  an  outcome of  social  policy.  The  British  government  has  published  several 
documents that see exclusion as a multi-dimensional but temporary phenomenon. They 
assume  that  anti-poverty  strategies  have  to  be  personalized  so  that  they  tackle  the 
allegedly  heterogeneous  and  fluid  factors  of  exclusion.  However,  as  the  concrete 
wording shows, a second implication entails that exclusion is a stable social condition 
instead of a process. Such a rhetorical shift dramatically limits the scope of action. In 
the end, the proclaimed concern with individualized solutions to a multi-dimensional 
problem is reduced to getting a low-paid job and changing the allegedly passive culture 
of the poor. 
Similarly, in Argentina, Brazil and Chile the same arguments are often mentioned in 
order to defend educational anti-poverty policy. As I have already commented, regional 
organizations recall the multiple sides of human poverty, aim to empower the needy, 
and argue that targeting is an efficient strategy after the terrible 1980s (CEPAL 2002, 
World Bank 2004).  To be precise,  the  logic of  induction  plays  a  major  role  in  the 
continental  political  and  academic  publications  as  well  as  in  our  sample  including 
governmental  texts  about  educational  targeting  and  interviews  with  policy-makers, 
program managers  and head-teachers  in  Argentina,  Brazil  and Chile.  The following 
empirical  observations  come from this  source  and have  been collected  in  the  three 
countries (see note 2).
In 1993 the National Education Ministry implemented the Social Educational Plan in 
Argentina at the same time as the bulk of educational competencies was transferred to 
regional  governments.  The  plan  operated  until  the  late  nineties  delivering 
supplementary  aid  to  the  poorer  schools  in  order  to  improve  their  facilities, 
management, pedagogic materials and student grants. Its name and institutional device 
changed later on, and its philosophy is currently challenged, but the main initiatives 
have  persisted.  In  1999  an  evaluation  reported  a  slight  beneficial  effect  on  school 
survival and performance. At that time a full ethnographic account nevertheless blamed 
the program for breaking the public service ethos of Argentinean schools. Certainly, 
such  a  perverse  effect  was  due  to  financial  shortcomings  and  policy  contradictions 
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between the Ministry and many provincias, but it was also the outcome of an intensive 
‘discursive work’ that flooded schools and low paid teachers with lots of pedagogic 
materials  they  couldn’t  even  read  (Duschatzky  and  Redondo  2000).  Although  the 
dramatic political changes don’t allow to attribute any linear effect to that initiative, it 
probably  contributed  to  strengthen  emulation.  Significantly,  nowadays  hierarchical 
comparison is pervasive and persistent in spite of the new terrible widespread poverty: 
even more, parents and teachers keep comparing the more and less prestigious schools 
for the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ poor under these adverse general circumstances (Feijóo and 
Corbetta  2004).  In some cases  these comparisons  are  crudely poignant,  because the 
poorest  schools  eventually  work as  social  service  centers  providing day shelter  and 
basic food instead of systematic teaching to their impoverished students. Our interviews 
have detected wide political debates about possible alternatives to educational targeting 
that could deal with such reality.
In Brazil educational targeting is alleged to be an instrument of the universal social right 
to education emphatically proclaimed by the constitution and the education act passed in 
the late eighties. Ten years later the Federal government realized that these objectives 
were not  fully  met,  and implemented  two targeted programs:  one of them provided 
municipalities with incentives in order to increase enrolment and reinforce the weakest 
schools, the other one delivered grants to poor families in order to make enrolment sure 
and put a curb on child labor. For these years Federal, regional and local governments 
have  launched  their  own  schemes,  and  co-ordination  problems  have  multiplied. 
Furthermore,  some municipalities  such as Belo Horizonte (Minas  Gerais)  and Porto 
Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul) have stretched the objectives by delivering bigger grants 
and implementing team- work in poor schools. Available evaluations report a positive 
impact on enrolment as well as a popular feeling that the less generous Federal and state 
programs  discriminate  some  schools  with  respect  to  municipal  programs.  As  a 
consequence,  emulation  is  at  stake  in  several  ways,  because  not  only  inter-school 
differences  become  very  visible,  but  also  huge  cultural  distances  become  apparent 
between the  educational  style  of  poor  families  and the  new pedagogic  expectations 
(Tarabini 2004). Thus, critiques blame targeting for low co-ordination and uncertain 
impact  on  performance,  whereas  supporters  attempt  to  expand  both  grants  and 
pedagogic innovation.
In Chile rural, minority and low performing primary and secondary schools are targeted 
(see  the  Government  of  Chile-  Mineduc  2004  website).  Interviews  and  official 
documents have often illustrated the contradictions of such a variety of applications as 
well  as  several  intended  and  unintended  ‘emulation  impacts’.  First,  the  primary 
education  targeted  program  (900  Schools)  was  complemented  with  community 
development until 2003, when OECD published its data coming from the international 
student  assessment  that  reported  low performance  and  exacerbate  disparities  in  the 
country. Then the program was downplayed by a new strategy that emphasized basic 
literacy and arithmetic skills,  and the new targeted devices that were devised for the 
remaining  ‘critical  schools’  were  privatized.  Second,  rural  education  has  become  a 
targeted program on the grounds that academic performance is lower and poverty rates 
are higher in rural areas. Thus, this program entails a combination of a selective strategy 
such as targeting and a universalistic strategy such as supplying school places to all the 
municipalities. However, this combination not only leads to a hierarchical comparison 
between rural and urban allegedly normal schools, but the program is also featured as a 
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tool to halt emigration from rural areas towards the capital, which is a consequence of 
economic hardship due to seasonal agricultural work (Agacino 2003). 
Third, the Chilean education policy is presented as a best practice inasmuch as it has 
transformed intercultural  education into a targeting device (CEPAL 2002: 153).  The 
program  managers  argue  that  it  was  the  only  feasible  solution  at  the  time  of  the 
democratic  transition  in  1990.  Apart  from  the  inevitable  contention  that  this 
understanding  opens  with  respect  to  curriculum  contents  and  cultural  rights,  other 
derived strains clearly  reproduce  a  game of  hierarchical  comparison connected  with 
categorical inequality. For instance, the program seeks recognition and compensation 
simultaneously  so  that  official  performance  objectives  are  eventually  limited  to  a 
minimal progress far below the national average. Finally, in several interviews head- 
teachers  have  openly  declared  that  targeted  schools  concentrate  students  with 
psychological,  social  and  even  environmental  (due  to  pesticides)  problems,  and 
sometimes have lived their inclusion into the 900 Schools Program as a stigma. These 
four partial findings sketch important connections between the logic of induction and 
emulation in Chile and portray the political conjuncture where it has received a sounder 
legitimization  albeit  opposition  parties  have  already  suggested  to  substitute  it  for 
excellence grants.
In summary, the analysis leads to two conclusions. On the one hand, target groups are 
supposed to be activated by means of economic aid and pedagogic support, but these 
expectations can be mere wishful thinking due to the second messages about control and 
stigma.  Even worse,  the  logic  of  induction  risks  to  become a  sort  of  self-fulfilling 
prophecy that blames the victim, because it asks low performing schools and students to 
compare their adverse circumstances with remote educational ideals. Both in targeted 
and  non-targeted  schools  teachers  and  parents  retrieve  a  permanent  categorical 
comparison  whereby  educational  inequality  is  depicted  as  an  objective,  inexorable 
reality that can only be partially alleviated. At least, educational targeting has translated 
this image into a message for people engaged with the collapsing urban schools that 
only received some books and journals in Argentina, with the schools not included in 
the progressive municipal programs in many Brazilian cities as well as with the wide 
array of targeted ‘special’  schools in Chile. On the other hand, some policy-makers, 
some  program  managers  and  many  teachers  realize  so  important  shortcomings  of 
educational targeting that feel the need to look for alternative solutions. At the moment 
we can  only  observe  this  emerging political  conflict.  Certainly,  more  intensive  and 
extensive  anti-poverty  policies  could  hinder  the  cumulative  effect  that  the  logic  of 
induction and emulation produce, but at the moment these are so secondary, local or 
new proposals that we ignore if they are able to. 
Persistent Territorialization of Educational Inequalities
Some estimations of educational inequalities in Argentina, Brazil and Chile have found 
out signs of a stable trend rather than a clear equalization. Although literacy, schooling 
and drop-out rates have improved, the rural- urban divide (at least, in Brazil and Chile) 
and regional disparities are almost constant.
GRAPHIC 1
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In Argentina the average 15-to-24 years-old youth had studied for 7,8 years in 1980, for 
9 years in 1990 and for 10,1 years in 2000 (CEPAL 2002). Since the nineties graduation 
has  improved  slightly  at  lower  secondary  education  or  EGB3,  but  coefficients  of 
variation remain at the same level (Graphic 1).  According to a recent report (CIPPEC 
2003), regional disparities may have even grown up. Whereas some provincias have fully 
implemented the 1993 educational reform, others have been reluctant to do so. If they are 
compared, the conclusion is that basic educational indicators portray persistent (or maybe 
exacerbating)  regional  disparity.  In  Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires  (CABA),  Río 
Negro and Neuquén, which have not implemented the reform at the higher courses of 
primary education, enrolment and drop-out rates have lagged behind the other regions. In 
secondary education the reluctant governments have been CABA, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, La 
Rioja, Neuquén, Río Negro and Tucumán. Although their drop-out rates are better than the 
average, their enrolment rates are worse.
GRAPHIC 2
In Brazil the youth went to school for 6,6 years in 1990 and 7,5 years in 2000, but the  
ratio between the urban and the rural average was the same as in 1979. Certainly, urban- 
rural gaps have been significantly reduced under democratic rule,  but two important 
exceptions still show their persistence in recent times. First, during the nineties the ratio 
has worsened by decreasing further below 1 with regards to the less educated (with less 
than  six  years  of  schooling),  because  this  group  has  only  experienced  a  very  low 
reduction in rural areas; second, there are almost no young people who have studied for 
more than thirteen years in these rural areas (Table 1). On the other hand, the trend of 
finished courses has recorded an increasing inter-state mean but a constant variation in 
the nineties (Graphic 2). Even more, UNDP (2003) has estimated that literacy advances 
in most regions of this big country except for the poor North East. This datum indicates 
how educational inequalities intermingle with changing territorialization,  because the 
regional  Northern  stagnation  contrasts  with  the  powerful  global  links  of  Southern 
regions, where two global technological hubs have emerged in Sao Paulo and Campinas 
(UNDP 2001).
GRAPHIC 3
In Chile territorial stable educational inequalities appear at higher rates of enrolment, 
since  the  urban youth  stay  in  the  education  system for  the  same ten  years  as  their 
Argentinean neighbors, and the rural youth mean years of schooling are nine. But there 
are other signs of stability  instead of equalization:  the urban average has eventually 
stagnated,  the  urban-  rural  ratio  has  been  almost  constant  at  the  level  of  the  less 
educated, and university population (with 13 or more years of schooling) has not clearly 
increased in spite of secondary education growth (Table 1). Besides, more students have 
certainly passed their final exams at secondary education, but the variation of failure 
rates between regions has increased instead of decreased (Graphic 3). 
TABLE 1
Comparative international studies don’t report on inequality trends yet, but suggest some 
further clues about social change and educational inequality. As to literacy and enrolment, 
the Education Index of the three countries is close to the OECD 0,94 average, since it 
scores  0,94  in  Argentina,  0,90  in  Brazil  and  0,89  in  Chile  (UNDP  2003).  As  to 
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performance,  their  mean score is  significantly low (OECD and UNESCO/UIS, 2003); 
however,  Argentina  and  Chile  record  much  more  exacerbate  inequalities  than  Brazil 
(Duru-Bellat, Mons and Suchaut 2004), and most Latin American education systems yield 
worse indexes of effectiveness and equity than these three cases (Willms and Sommers 
2001). Thus, the resulting development trend portrays a multi-dimensional economic and 
educational crisis in Argentina, shows that Brazil avails of its lower GDP per capita in a 
more effective way for education, and records a mismatch between economic growth and 
educational development in Chile. 
Conclusion
In  the  nineties  the  democratic  governments  of  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  drew  on 
educational  and  social  targeting  in  order  to  deal  with  poverty  in  a  very  complex 
conjuncture.  Both  the  need  to  compensate  for  terrible  inequality  as  well  as  the 
recommendations  included  in  the  global  educational  and social  agenda  inspired  those 
decisions.  Targeting  was compatible  with the  financial  conservatism promoted by the 
global economic policy agenda; and sub-national political scales also played a role due to 
the coincidence of targeting and de-centralization.
In my opinion, educational targeting has contributed to keep educational inequality stable 
in the three countries. This policy is actually an element of the official pedagogic discourse 
(Bernstein 1990, 1996) that can be defined as the logic of induction. Such logic entails that 
low achievers  can  be  identified  and successfully  stimulated  in  the  same way as  low 
performing schools can be helped by means of pedagogic and economic support. 
The logic of induction establishes the social norm of emulation (Tilly 1998) by compelling 
the disadvantaged to assimilate the social practices attributed to more prestigious social 
archetypes. According to some pieces of evidence, the former has actually intermingled 
with the latter:  for  instance,  years  ago targeted  schools  were flooded with books and 
leaflets  without  responding to  their  crude  material  problems  in  Argentina;  nowadays, 
overlapping programs create new hierarchies between schools in Brazil, and targeting has 
become a one-size-fits-all  solution  for school  failure,  rural  schooling and intercultural 
education in Chile.
The whole process provokes noticeable territorial consequences as far as the homogeneity 
of education systems and the deprived regions are concerned. Actually, in spite of some 
partial progress, the Economic Commission and the three governments report significant 
continuity concerning urban- rural gaps in schooling and regional disparities in secondary 
education. 
This conclusion shouldn’t suggest a static understanding nevertheless, because a discourse 
not only reflects  interests  and conflicts  but can also raise  opposition.  Nowadays,  new 
voices  propose  to  re-design  anti-poverty  strategies  in  these  three  countries,  either 
substituting targeting by wider choice opportunities, by reforming the logic of induction or 
simply by surpassing its selective scope. According to my analysis, so far targeting has 
allowed  a  wide  room for  emulation,  but  we  still  ignore  whether  its  reforms  or  the 
alternative strategies can eventually constrain this room. 
Notes 
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Graphic 1 Graduation Rates in Primary and Secondary Education (Argentina, 
1996-9)
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Graphic 2 Expected and effective educational results (Brazil regions, 1995-2000)
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Graphic 3 Pass, Failure and Drop-out Rates in Secondary Education (Chile, 1990-
2000)
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Table 1: Years of schooling, 15-24 years old population, Brazil and Chile
Brazil Chile
1979 1990 2000 1990 2000
Mean years
Urban zones 6,4 6,6 7,5 10,1 10,6
Rural zones 4,2 3,6 4,9 7,9 8,9
Urban-rural ratio (equality =1) 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.2
Less than 6 years of schooling (%)
Urban zones 48,2 41 27 5,6 2,7
Rural zones 86,8 79 62,8 16,9 8,5
Urban-rural ratio (equality= 1) 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3
Between 6 and 9 years of schooling 
(%)
Urban zones 34,6 37,5 42,7 33,1 30,1
Rural zones 9,7 16,9 27,2 56,5 49,9
Urban-rural ratio (equality= 1) 3.5 2.2 1.6 0.6 0.6
Between 10 and 12 years of schooling 
(%)
Urban zones 14,1 18,2 26,7 45,5 51,1
Rural zones 1,9 3,7 9,5 22,6 37
Urban-rural ratio (equality= 1) 7.4 4.9 2.8 2 1.4
More than 12 years (%)
Urban zones 3,1 3,3 3,7 15,8 16,2
Rural zones 1,6 0,3 0,5 4,1 4,6
Urban-rural ratio (equality= 1) 3.8 3.5
Source: my own calculation in base to CEPAL (2002)
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